

DOE Review Completed

WORKING PAPER

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Mr. ~~or~~ Dr. H. E. Lyon
Director
Division of Safeguards and Security
Energy Research and Development
Administration
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Lyon:

On behalf of the Director, I am responding to your request for comments on ERDA's Plan for an International Communications Procedure for Non-Military Nuclear Emergencies. In brief, CIA feels that there is a need for a mechanism and procedure for handling non-military nuclear emergencies. We note, however, that included in the potential nuclear emergencies listed in the ERDA plan are some which come very close to military use of nuclear explosives.

Because of broad governmental interest and concern in the problem, it would appear appropriate to discuss the proposed plan in a broader forum to include State, ACDA, DoD, CIA, FBI, NSC and perhaps others. We are not convinced that ERDA should be the point of contact for all situations described in the plan.

Finally, in Appendix A of the plan we note that CIA is not included as one of the organizational entities to

be alerted when a non-military nuclear event has occurred. We feel that we also would require prompt notification in order to carry out our responsibilities efficiently and promptly.

Sincerely,

Leslie C. Dirks
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology



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UNITED STATES

ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Sir:

The Energy Research and Development Administration proposes entering into discussions with certain foreign nations relative to instituting an international communications procedure for non-military nuclear emergencies. ERDA perceives this procedure as a working system for international contacts between national officials who are responsible for nuclear programs in order that there may be an effective means for interchange of advice in time-urgent nuclear emergencies.

Enclosed for your information is a draft of ERDA's Plan for An International Communications Procedure for Non-Military Nuclear Emergencies" which outlines the concept in further detail. ERDA is coordinating this matter with the Department of State as a preliminary to initiating official contacts with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico. Subsequent discussions will be held with other nations as time and resources permit.

Your comments with respect to the proposed effort will be greatly appreciated. Please address your responses or any questions on this plan to the undersigned.

Sincerely,

H. E. Lyon, Director
Division of Safeguards and Security

Enclosure:
Draft Plan



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A PLAN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE
FOR NON-MILITARY NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES

I. GENERAL

A. PURPOSE

To establish a system for international communication to facilitate international cooperation in time-urgent non-military nuclear emergencies.

B. OBJECTIVES

1. To develop a concept of operations for immediate country-to-country working level and executive communications to provide early warning for responding to and countering non-military nuclear emergencies.
2. To exchange information with cooperating countries on national action coordinating systems and to define responsibilities of designated government offices or agencies involved in a coordinated investigation of and response to non-military nuclear emergencies.

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

A. BASIS FOR CONCERN

The inherent characteristics of nuclear material - high toxicity, radioactivity and destructive capacity - establish its uniqueness as a potential source of time-urgent emergency events of possible international concern. Two elements of reality support the need

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for establishing an international communication procedure for such emergency events: (1) anticipated spread of special nuclear material for research and electrical power production on a world-wide scale, and (2) the expansion of terrorism across international boundaries. An accidental release of radioactive contaminants in one nation could possibly involve the territories and people of other nations. So also can an act of sabotage by a terrorist group against one nation's nuclear fuel cycle facilities, or the theft of nuclear materials of one nation, have an adverse impact upon the health and safety of the people of other nations. These propositions make it highly desirable that a system of specific government-to-government points of communication be established to provide a basis for cooperation in non-military nuclear emergencies.

B. THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

Non-military nuclear emergencies which can involve serious potential danger to human life or the destruction of property may be the result of:

- a. Accidental release of toxic or radioactive materials threatening contamination of the environment;
- b. The theft or suspected loss of a strategic quantity of special nuclear material (plutonium, enriched uranium or uranium-233) or radioactive material.

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- c. A communicated, possibly real, intention to disperse contaminating radioactive material, or to detonate:
 - 1. an improvised nuclear device; or
 - 2. conventional high explosives combined with radioactive material;
- d. Sabotage of a facility involved in the nuclear fuel cycle or of a shipment of nuclear material in such manner as to create a serious hazard.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. IMMEDIACY OF ACTION

The consequences of a nuclear emergency of the type specified in Section II could be of such a magnitude that it becomes essential to develop a program now which will provide for immediate response actions.

Various inter- and intra-governmental disciplines must be actively enlisted for purposes of hazard assessment, decision-making and mobilization of all necessary resources. Furthermore, should a nuclear emergency occur as a result of a nation's inability to contain a threatened action, post-incident disaster management must be instituted and appropriate countermeasures initiated.

Since the consequences of a nuclear emergency in one nation can impact upon other nations, it is essential that broad scale

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operational preparedness be developed for an immediate country-to-country executive communication capability, and wherever feasible and practical, the sharing of such information as may be required to effectively react to the nuclear emergency.

B. REQUIREMENTS

1. Emergency Action and Assistance

- a. Identification of a single communication point within the government structure for receiving notifications relevant to non-military nuclear emergencies and communicating directly with other governmental agencies as may be required.
- b. Immediate, clearly understood and accurate communication channels to designated action representatives of concerned nations to transmit known details of an imminent emergency event.
- c. Continuing consultation capability to evaluate response actions in progress and to monitor the progression of an emergency.
- d. Identification of an authority capable of providing information and assistance to cooperating nations involved in a non-military nuclear emergency event.

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(In the United States, the Energy Research and Development Administration's Emergency Action and Coordination Team (EACT) is adequately equipped and manned and could if authorized perform these functions.)^{1/}

IV. OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Implementation of a Plan for an international communication procedure for non-military nuclear emergencies might be accomplished.

- A. Under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency; or
- B. With certain states, through the EURATOM structure; or
- C. Through direct country-to-country bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations, or
- D. Under the auspices of existing Safeguards Agreements for Cooperation.

^{1/} Appendix "A" to this Plan sets forth a conceptual U.S. National Action Coordinating System which might be adopted to serve as a reference in emergency events or as a format for the development of similar organizational assignments of responsibilities within the governmental structure of cooperating nations.

DRAFT

APPENDIX "A"

CONCEPTUAL U. S. NATIONAL ACTION COORDINATING SYSTEM

I. PURPOSE

The potential impact of a nuclear emergency involving contamination or the threat to detonate a nuclear device or to sabotage nuclear facilities or shipments necessitates the establishment of inter-governmental communication for potential resource allocations.

A. INTERDEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONAL NETWORK

1. On receipt of notification by the ERDA Emergency Operations Center of a non-military nuclear event occurring within or without the U.S., ERDA has the responsibility for assuring that the following organizational entities, as appropriate, are alerted on a priority basis: (not necessarily listed in order of priority)

1. Federal Bureau of Investigation
2. State Department Operations Center
3. White House Situation Room
4. National Military Command Center
5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
6. Federal Preparedness Agency

2. Direct liaison communications are maintained with interested U. S. Government organizations, as appropriate, throughout ERDA's involvement in a nuclear emergency.

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3. Resources as may be required by ERDA from other U. S. Government agencies are identified for priority command authorization by the agencies involved.

II. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

1. Provide primary point of communication as the Emergency Action and Coordination Team for cooperation in non-military nuclear emergencies within the United States.
2. Provide assistance in hazard assessment.
3. Provide nuclear material inventory verification.
4. Provide Surveillance Accident Nuclear Detection or Nuclear Emergency Search Team assistance.
5. Provide assistance in radiological decontamination.
6. Alert other appropriate U. S. Government organizations and apprise them of a nuclear emergency event.
7. Maintain a twenty-four hour Emergency Operations Center.

B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Provide for coordination of intergovernmental cooperative efforts in international non-military nuclear emergencies.

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2. Provide priority attention toward obtaining Presidential authority for the commitment of U.S. resources to assist in responding to international non-military nuclear emergencies.
3. Provide international diplomatic liaison channels.

C. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1. Provide primary law enforcement authority in non-military nuclear events (domestic).
2. Provide intelligence data in relation to threat assessment.
3. Provide liaison channels for international law enforcement communications.

D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Provide for coordinated military assistance in nuclear emergencies requiring explosive ordnance expertise or other military resources.
2. Provide available intelligence assistance to ERDA in relation to the threat assessment.

E. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Provide coordinated intelligence and intelligence analysis assistance as may be required in relation to threat assessment.

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F. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. Provide a point of contact for ERDA in nuclear emergency events directly involving NRC or state licensee nuclear fuel cycle facilities, or commercial nuclear materials known to be subject to U. S. licensing regulations.
2. Provide for participation in EACT operations in emergency events involving NRC or state licensee facilities or materials.
3. Provide inventory verifications, damage assessments and available manpower and resource assistance as may be required in an emergency.

G. FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

1. Provide resource coordination assistance.
2. Provide for coordination of governmental assistance in non-military nuclear emergencies.
3. Provide for the identification of agencies or installations maintaining resources which may be required in an emergency.

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